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A major social scientific response to the challenge of climate change 
centres on the idea of displacement. The complex chemistry of rising 
temperature that syncs unruly weather, sea level rise (SLR) and various 
forms of natural disasters have led social scientists to focus on the 
displacement of the significant number of the global population from 
their habitats and consequent migration elsewhere, in most cases to 
burgeoning urban spaces. Such concern for human displacement and 
sordid mobility is nowhere more salient than in Bangladesh. Locating 
Dhaka in the emerging debates on climate change is important for a 
number of reasons. Almost 40 per cent of Bangladesh’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) originates in Dhaka and its peri-urban areas. By 2025, 
with a population of 22 million, Dhaka is expected to overtake Shanghai, 
New York and Karachi to secure the fourth place among the megacities. 
The current population growth rate of more than 4 per cent is way above 
the national average and more than 18 million or roughly one-tenth of 
the country’s population live in this city. This makes Dhaka one of the 
world’s most densely populated cities, with more than 45,000 people 
inhabiting per square kilometre. By any measure, Dhaka represents the 
maximum demographic volatility of a megacity.  
This massive population crescendo is largely the result of constant 
flow of internal migrants from across the country. About half a million 




an unending exodus. Why is such a huge number heading for Dhaka? 
An exploration of the recent academic literature and media represent-
tations show a growing consensus on the reasons for Dhaka-bound 
migrations: climate change. The debates that emerged a couple of 
decades ago around more nuanced environmental and social factors of 
migration have more recently been bundled into one master narrative 
of climate change, with the concurrent message that migrants of Dhaka 
are climate refugees.2 
However, good governance of Dhaka is not just about adapting to 
climate change, but also about containing the massive inflow of popu-
lation into its cramped urban spaces. Climate change is certainly a major 
concern for Bangladesh, but it must not be conflated with the more 
immediate manmade ecological challenges with roots in specific political 
and social contexts across the country.  
Macroeconomic contexts  
Over the past two decades, the industrial and service sectors in Bangla-
desh have seen remarkable growth, while the agricultural sector has 
shrunk. Accordingly, the percentage of employment in agriculture has 
steadily declined, from 69.51 per cent in 1991 to 40.15 per cent in 2018 
(World Bank Group 2018). As far as migration to Dhaka is concerned, 
there are two implications of this macroeconomic trend. Dhaka is the 
hub of the country’s economy with most facilities associated with the 
industrial and service sectors thriving inside the city and its peri-urban 
areas. In the garment sector, the second largest after China, at least 80 
per cent of factories are located in the greater Dhaka region. Most of 
Dhaka’s GDP is generated in the more than the 4,000 garments 
industrial units in and around the city, employing about 5 million 
workers and staff. This sector is still showing signs of growth, with 
annual earnings of more than 32 billion dollars in 2018 (Akter 2019). 
Healthcare, education and other employment opportunities are con-
stantly evolving around the garment and service sectors. So, the decline 
of the agricultural sector in terms of both the range of employment and 
share in GDP and the growth in industrial and service sectors need to be 
considered in any discussion on migration into Dhaka.   
Beyond the city’s vibrant industrial and service sectors that have 
taken millions of people out of the agricultural sector, there are certain 
social factors that have contributed towards migration to Dhaka. A 
government report estimates that in 2004 about 38.5 per cent of 
internal migration in the country took place due to employment and 
business activities, while in 2011 about 38.7 per cent of internal 




migration due to natural calamity, family quarrel and women tortured 
or deserted by spouse was 2.1 per cent, 1.2 per cent and 0.2 per cent, 
respectively (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2015: 78f.).  
Dhaka is not just a magnetic field of no return. Amid in-migration, 
there is significant outmigration too, 9 per cent against in-migration of 
16.42 per cent. If the countryside or smaller urban areas were non-
habitable due to climate change, out-migration would not have taken 
place at more than 50 per cent of in-migration (Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics 2015: 28). The recognition of the macroeconomic drive for 
migration into Dhaka cannot, however, conceal the fact that the largest 
numbers of migrants into the city are those who are affected by some 
form of environmental challenges. To what extent are these environ-
mental issues climate-induced?  
Beyond the climate threshold  
Salinity: The progressive salinisation of the coastal regions in Bangla-
desh has affected human health and agriculture as well as fish habitat 
and the Sundarban’s ecosystems. Against the Food and Agricultural 
Organization’s (FAO) prescribed allowable salinity level of 1⁄2 gram per 
kilogram (kg) of water, in some coastal regions, the level ranges from 4 
grams per kg in the monsoon season up to 13 grams per kg in the dry 
season. About 20 million of the 37 million Bangladeshis living in the 
coastal areas are susceptible to the problem of excessive salinity 
(Colligan 2011; Dasgupta et al. 2015; Vogl 2011). Agricultural land 
affected by soil salinity has been found to be 0.83 million hectares (ha), 
1.02 million ha and 1.06 million ha in 1973, 2000 and 2009, respectively 
(General Economics Division 2015: i).  
The salinisation process in coastal Bangladesh started as early as the 
1960s with the postcolonial development planning of the coastal regions 
that included the construction of polders. The sluggish water current due 
to barrages and other water management structures put on the major 
rivers flowing from India to Bangladesh was another factor that caused 
salinity. The Farakka barrage on the Ganges across the border, in 
operation since 1975, significantly slowed the river current, allowing 
oceanic water to penetrate inside the land (Rahman & Rahman 2015: 
99). Salinity in the northern part of the Sundarbans region increased 
from 7.50 per cent in 1968 to 12.50 per cent in 1976 (March) and to 
18.50 per cent (May), reflecting the immediate impact of the barrage 
(Aziz & Paul 2015: 248). Current structures existing upstream as well 
as future plans for new dams and diversions in the catchments of the 
Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers will lead to significant changes 




of freshwater in the coastal zones, leading to further intrusion of saline 
water from the Bay of Bengal. Since the 1980s, shrimp cultivation and 
poor drainage associated with it in the coastal regions has been another 
major factor causing salinisation in coastal Bangladesh.  
Of all the exportable fish in Bangladesh, valued at 437.40 million 
dollars annually, about 57 per cent comes from shrimp cultivation, on 
0.276 million ha of land, inviting the inflow of saline water (Kabir & Iva 
2014: 7). This does not downplay the argument that global warming 
and the consequent SLR lead to salinity in the coastal Bengal Delta, but 
what it suggests is that SLR is not the only and dominant determinant 
of salinity in the region. In fact, the historically accumulated structural 
decadence of the deltaic sweet water regime caused by the immediate 
impact of human activities has made the delta more vulnerable than it 
could have been because of SLR itself. One may also note that the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) estimation of SLR along 
the Bangladesh coast in the past two decades had no similar pattern due 
to subsidence as well as lack of sedimentation (van Scheltinga 2015).  
Cyclones: Bangladesh is cyclone-prone because of its geographical 
location and exposure to a strong monsoon trail. The extent of damages 
from cyclones to human life and property in the country depends mostly 
on the extent of protection provided by what has been historically 
termed as the "forest belt" of the Sundarbans that protected inhabitants 
from cyclones arriving across the Bay of Bengal. In the 1850s, a British 
surveyor warned that the rate at which deforestation was taking place, 
if not stopped, would lead to the thinning of the forest belt of the Sun-
darbans leading to greater human causalities. The warning proved 
tragically true within two decades, in 1876, when more than 200,000 
people were killed by a cyclone in Barishal district which had seen 
deforestation up to the sea (Iqbal 2010: 58-59). The lack of affores-
tation in the following decades resulted in the decline of natural protec-
tion of coastal habitats, culminating in the death of almost half a million 
people in the cyclone of 1970, which remains the deadliest of all cyclones 
in recorded history (Ali 1999: 111).  
Despite historical lessons, deforestation has not stopped in 
Bangladesh. Excepting some occasional spell of afforestation, the more 
general trend has been towards deforestation. According to an Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) report of 2016, Bangladesh ranks the third 
country in Asia with lowest proportion of forests (11 per cent). Without 
contradicting the scientific data of progressive rise of temperature in the 
Bay of Bengal region, it may be suggested that human vulnerability and 
displacement due to storms and cyclones have been more directly 




itself, whether they are increasingly being caused by global warming or 
a combination of many factors.  
Bangladesh is not the only country prone to cyclones. Of the 10 most 
tropical cyclone-hit regions in the world, China tops the list with 127 
typhoon landfalls since 1970. China is followed by the Philippines, Japan, 
Mexico, the United States, Australia, Taiwan, Vietnam, Madagascar and 
Cuba (Belles 2016). It is true that a remarkable number of cyclones 
brew in the Bay of Bengal, but those also affect the Andamans, West 
Bengal as well as Myanmar, and not just Bangladesh. In terms of actual 
landfall of cyclones, Bangladesh is not even among the top 10 countries. 
Since the 1991 cyclone, when about 150,000 people perished, there has 
been a remarkable decrease in cyclone-related death and injuries. In 
the most severe cyclone in recent years in 2007, the number of deaths 
amounted to 4,234, a 100-fold reduction in the death toll compared to 
the cyclone of 1970. Whereas in Myanmar in 2008, cyclone Nargis killed 
more than 140,000 people and seriously affected about 2.4 million 
people (Haque et al. 2012: 151). What has saved lives in Bangladesh in 
the more recent past is the developed warning system and better pre-
paredness, in the absence of a protective thick forest belt. What can be 
learned from this is that people are relatively less affected recently and 
there are fewer reasons to believe that every cyclone is creating and 
sending "climate refugees" to Dhaka, much less so in the past two 
decades.  
Flooding: Flooding is probably the most recurrent natural disaster in 
Bangladesh. About 3.48 million people are affected by flooding in the 
country, second only to India where 4.84 million people are affected by 
this disaster annually. Bangladesh has the highest percentage of GDP 
affected by flooding in the Asia Pacific region. The connection of climate 
change to Bangladesh flooding is still projection-based. The country is 
historically flood-prone and its location at the receiving end of three 
major Asian river systems makes it a natural candidate for flooding in 
the monsoon season. But, the natural setting in which flooding was 
expected traditionally by the agrarian community has been altered 
significantly at least in the past one century. These include the impacts 
from the construction of railways and highways on the embankment in 
a deltaic plain that often ran against the natural north–south flow of the 
drainage of the rivers. 
A second set of issues relate to deforestation in the higher regions 
outside of Bangladesh, such as in north-eastern India and Nepal, leading 
to flash floods. A third set of issues is linked to the construction of 




season and opens the sluice gates during the monsoon season, contri-
buting to both drought and flooding in Bangladesh. A fourth issue is the 
embanking or raising of the beds of rivers. When a combination of high 
precipitation and these material factors act together, a major flood takes 
place.  
Yet, a deeper examination reveals that what is perceived as flood is 
actually a sustained waterlogging condition. The official reflection of the 
problems of drainage in the Bengal Delta was first observed in the 
1840s, when a panel of colonial experts suggested that all existing em-
bankments in the delta should be removed for allowing the free flow of 
water. With the emergence of the railways, which were to be built on 
the embankments, such suggestions were side lined. The problems of 
waterlogging and flood initially concentrated in the western Bengal mori-
bund delta area, but by the 1920s in the entire Bengal delta, including 
what constitutes today’s Bangladesh, waterlogging rather than flooding 
became the problem. With the reduction of navigable waters and 
construction of highways for motorised vehicles, the problems worsened 
in the following decades.  
As of 2015, the total length of national, regional and district level 
highways in Bangladesh is 22,096 kilometres (km). The length of the 
railway network is 2,877 km. More than 90 per cent of these roads and 
railways are built on high embankments across the wetland areas and 
often against running water, creating many compartments of water-
logged areas. Rural roads are also raised haphazardly across the country 
causing waterlogging. In addition to transport networks that have 
blocked natural drainage, there have been many other forms of struc-
tures, including unplanned housings and bridges with inadequate space 
for flow of water, polders, silted riverbeds, near-dead or dead rivers and 
shrimp gher that have made waterlogging worse. Illegal encroachment 
of riverbanks and unplanned aquaculture are additional problems. 
Bangladesh is essentially a massive natural basin blocked by manmade 
structures all over.  
One major example of what is discussed above is the south-western 
coastal region of the country, where about 682 km2 of land under four 
districts is under perennial waterlogged condition, affecting about half a 
million people. Waterlogging in this area started in the mid-1960s, soon 
after the construction of 37 polders and 282 sluice gates that made 
natural drainage almost impossible. With the silt raising river beds in 
the process, this has taken a serious turn since the 1980s. As part of a 
20-year master plan, 8,200 km of embankments were constructed along 
with 4,300 bridges and 9,000 hydraulic structures, irrigation and 




1989, this region along with other regions continued to be heavily under 
embankment, with the problem of waterlogging continuing. The FAP 
added more to the long process of structural damages to the drainage 
system of the Bengal Delta that started in the 1960s (Custers 1993). 
Currently, therefore, what is often pictured as flooding due to climate 
change is in fact a massive condition of waterlogging that has been 
caused by human and institutional actors.  
Land erosion: Loss of land by riverbank erosion is a major factor in 
the displacement and destitution of a huge number of the Bangladeshi 
population. Such erosion is taking place mostly along the banks of the 
major rivers with strong fluvial dynamics. In the last four decades, 
during 1973–2013, a total of 153,438 ha of lands have been eroded 
along the Padma (lower Ganges) and Jamuna rivers (General Economics 
Division 2015a: 52). It is estimated that 283 locations and 85 towns 
along with 2,400 km of riverbank lines are vulnerable to erosion and 
that about 130,000 people are displaced annually due to riverbank 
erosion (Mollah & Ferdaush 2015: 125). Annual economic losses due to 
erosion are estimated at BDT 1,000 crore (FAO 2010: 3).  
Is land erosion taking place due to climate change? This is a moot 
point which requires further examination, but apparently in some parts 
of the Sundarbans forest areas, especially in the extreme southern edge, 
erosion is taking place due to lack of sediment supply, which again is 
caused by the Farakka and other barrages and dams upstream (Akter 
et al. 2016: 1217). Another factor causing land erosion is the training 
of rivers that take place during the construction of major bridges. For 
example, in Sirajganj district, one of the most erosion-prone regions in 
Bangladesh, the major channel of Jamuna river has been stressed to 
shift 315 metre per year eastward. As Rahman and Suzuki (2010: 123-
30) suggest, 'the helical flow developed with the interaction of guide 
bund creates local scours and helps to shift the river bank eastward.'  
Distributive justice  
If the major environmental problems in Bangladesh are not entirely 
influenced by climate change, what does this mean for governance of 
migration into Dhaka city? There is little doubt about the Bangladeshi 
government’s sincere quest for climate justice at a global level or 
policies for adaptation. The pertinent issue here is the need to locate the 
political, social and legal context of displacement of a large section of 
population with particular attention to broader earth-bound ecological 
challenges that have been largely conflated with climate change and 




So far, policy responses to the displacement of people within Bangla-
desh have been threefold. First, the "compensationist" approach that 
seeks climate justice in the form of financial assistance to tackle the 
impact of climate change and the occasional demand for relocation of 
climate refugees to other developed countries which are largely respon-
sible for the climate crisis. Despite remarkable success in making 
Bangladesh an important case for climate vulnerability, the country has 
failed to make the most of the momentum. The recent refunding of 13 
million pound, part of a 75-million-pound deal, to the Government of 
United Kingdom around disputes over the process of disbursement is a 
contradiction to the global climate justice argument. The Bangladeshi 
government argued that the fund, promised in 2008, should not be 
transmitted through the World Bank as it would attach unacceptable 
strings, including a high interest rate. But this development took place 
only within a few weeks of a pledge of 2 billion dollars for Climate-smart 
Development from the World Bank itself. This not only raises questions 
on the shifting ground of the policy process, it also undermines the 
global climate justice movement for which Bangladesh itself has been 
campaigning.  
Second, the "adaptationist" approach looks to secure rights and 
services for climate refugees in their place of refuge. This approach is 
apparently gaining more ground as a host of organisations and research-
ers are linking it with issues of human rights, vulnerability and the need 
for a humane approach towards the displaced people, especially in 
creating smooth transitions to the new environment they settle in. Yet, 
this approach seems to be less interested in the fundamental causes of 
displacement itself or the preventive aspects of the problem.  
The third approach could be termed as "distributive justice", which 
seeks to help vulnerable people with resources from an existing pool. 
This approach remains the weakest link in the governance mechanism 
in Bangladesh, although the country is rich in natural resources that are 
capable of mitigating the impacts of displacement. The sedimental 
accretion or the char land looks to be an important tool for this third 
category of responses to the challenge of displacement which, in Bangla-
desh, is generally linked with functional landlessness.  
Whatever standard of measurement is used for understanding the 
level of landlessness, this problem has grown progressively in Bangla-
desh and now is at its most critical point. The preliminary report of the 
2008 Agricultural Census found 3.26 million rural households as landless 
(11.4 per cent of the total rural households) and 7.9 million rural tenant 
households (27.8 per cent of all rural households) (FAO 2010: 5). A 




less than 2.5 acres of land and 39 per cent of the households own less 
than 0.5 acres, being functionally landless (Herrera 2016).  
The massive loss of land due to river bank erosion and the resultant 
displacement of people are generally projected as a factor for the 
increased "climate refugees" in Dhaka. Yet, Bangladesh not only suffers 
from land erosion, it also benefits from natural accretion or pro-
gradation of lands, both on the riverbeds within the mainland and in the 
estuary, through a complex geological process involving silt, fluvial and 
tidal flow. The country’s estuary receives at least one billion tonnes of 
sediments with one trillion cubic metres of water across the Himalayas, 
which is reflected in the fact that the sediment discharge from the lower 
Meghna river has been the third highest and the water discharge is the 
fourth highest among river systems in the world (Akter et al. 2016: 
1218).  
During the four decades between 1973 and 2013, total area of 
accreted land was 53,000 ha which was less than the land lost, 
amounting to about a third. But in some regions, especially the Meghna 
estuary, the accretion of land is greater than the erosion. In the last 
decade, the net annual accretion in the Meghna estuary has been 13.11 
km (General Economics Division 2015a: 54). The lesser degree of 
accretion of new land in the coastal region is, however, often attributed 
to the geomorphological changes brought about by the Farakka barrage 
and other structures upstream of many rivers that flow into Bangladesh.  
After decades of ecologically unsustainable development and eco-
nomic activities that have led to salinity, deforestation, land erosion and 
flooding, new policy shifts are towards adopting the Dutch experience of 
progradation of land through the artificial process of silt trapping 
through cross dams and other processes, what have come to be known 
as "tidal management". Before the project was formally initiated in 
2014, the Bangladesh Water Development Board with support from the 
Netherlands had already seen the reclamation of about 1,000 km2 of 
land on the Noakhali coast through Meghna cross dams. In the next two 
decades, Bangladesh expects to reclaim about 10,000 km2 of land 
(Islam 2015).  
This continuing process of land formation is in addition to the already 
existing land under the government known as khas land, comprising 
mostly of the accreted land or chars. Critics of the land reforms and land 
governance in Bangladesh are, therefore, not just focusing on the 
mathematical figures of loss and gain of land through the deltaic 
geological process, but also on the problem of accessing currently 
available land resources by the landless (Barkat et al. 2001). There are 




1.3 million acres have gone out of government control, being illegally 
grabbed by politically and financially influential people.  
The policy of settlement of granting of char land to the landless and 
destitute goes back to the precolonial practices of offering entitlement 
to primary land reclaimers. This policy of the state favouring the enter-
prising farmers continued until the turn of the twentieth century when, 
in the context of anti-colonial nationalist politics, the policy of securing 
entitlement of khas land to enterprising and needy peasants was 
replaced by a policy of offering these lands to politically and socially 
influential forces in a view to contain their political ambitions. Despite 
several reforms in postcolonial Pakistan and independent Bangladesh, 
this practice of politically calculated redistribution of land resources has 
continued, although the Policy for Settlement of Agricultural Khas Land 
of 1997 specifically reiterated that newly emerged land had to be 
distributed to the landless. The failure of putting a governance strategy 
into practice is reflected in the fact that currently 'only 7 per cent of char 
lands are in possession of 77 per cent of the population and 23 per cent 
of population who are primarily land grabbers, are in possession of 93 
per cent of char lands' (Ullah 2016). In a statement in Parliament in 
2010, the Bangladesh Minister of Land informed that 1.3 million hectares 
of government-owned land had been "grabbed" (Anonymous 2010).  
The Bangladesh government is attentive to the improvement of lively-
hood and market access for char dwellers in some places, but the 
restoration of entitlements to the char dwellers does not form a part of 
the broader planning in Bangladesh. There is no discussion on the root 
causes of landlessness and its remedies in the latest five-year plan of 
2016-20 (General Economics Division 2015b). If even thousands of 
acres of land are accreted as planned in the Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100, 
the problem of landlessness and the migration of millions to Dhaka city 
will not be solved without a strong pro-poor policy framework in connec-
tion to the alluvial and reclaimed land regime.  
Conclusions  
Like many low-lying territories across the world, Bangladesh is 
vulnerable to climate change. But a distinction must be made between 
climate-induced problems and non-climatic challenges in a view to avoid 
an epistemic crisis in which knowledge about climate change shows only 
a 'limited effect on shaping concern about climate change' (Shi 2016: 
759-62). Dhaka’s escalating demographic profile lends an easy explan-
ation on the impact of climate change in the form of climate refugees, 
which is not always supported by empirical evidences from across the 




are slowly emerging, which suggest that it is too early to talk about 
climate change refugees in Bangladesh (Roy et al. 2016). Recent 
researches are also talking about the need to focus on the problems of 
"immobility" rather than "mobility" in a given condition of natural 
disasters (Findlay 2012).  
This article is not premised on climate scepticism, neither on denial 
of climate change’s impact on Bangladesh. Neither does it suggest that 
Bangladesh should stop taking the lead in demanding climate justice or 
garnering international support in the face of climate change affecting 
many developing countries. But, there are reasons to contest the notion 
that all problems, including the unsustainable migration to Dhaka from 
across the country, are due to climate change. The article suggests that 
dangers from the four major natural disasters facing Bangladesh, 
flooding, salinity, land erosion and cyclones, have causes and impacts 
relating to both climate change and beyond it and that these problems 
demand a holistic approach. Therefore, while mitigation and adaption 
approaches must be given continued attention, there is a need for a 
focused governance of relations between vulnerable people and their 
access to existing ecological resources.  
The question of displacement is a recurrent issue in both the miti-
gation and adaptation approaches. Why is equal emphasis not given to 
the need for linking the displacement discourse with distributive justice? 
Failure to link human displacement to distributive justice will place 
Dhaka in a precarious situation in two ways. First, the creation of even 
more new lands, either by artificial means or by natural progradation, 
will not stop displacement of people if proper and just entitlement to 
land is not secured to the landless and land-poor. Second, once the 
current projective impact of climate change takes place in a more direct 
and expansive manner, Bangladesh will see more real-time climate 
refugees, who will outnumber refugees created by economic and social 
opportunities in the cities. In both cases, Dhaka will be the prime spot 
for a demographic explosion brewing out of displacements in the coun-
tryside. In the coming years, therefore, planning and actions need to 
move beyond the issues of mitigation and adaptation and there is a need 
to place the question of securing entitlements to ecological resources 
centrally within the discourse of distributive justice.  
Endnotes 
1 Iftekhar Iqbal´s article with the same title was originally published in Economic and Political 
Weekly, vol. 54 (36), 07 Sept 2019, pp. 26-31. The editorial board of the South Asia Chronicle 
expresses its gratitude for granting the permission to reprint the article. 
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2 Links between climate change and migrations to Dhaka are highlighted in such international 
media headlines as "Dhaka: the city where climate refugees are already a reality;" "Dhaka: climate 
refugees and a collapsing city"; or "Climate migration drives slum growth in Dhaka." In January 
2019, a National Geographic report corroborated the World Bank’s assessment that climate 
change, by inducing the displacement of up to 13.3 million by 2050, is Bangladesh’s "number one 
driver of internal migration" mostly affecting Dhaka. 
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